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1. Introduction
It is widely believed that the application of science to technology is responsible for the massive
increases in prosperity the world has experienced since the onset of the industrial revolution.
Modern growth theory identies the accumulation of scientic knowledge as the primary source
of growth (e.g. Aghion & Howitt 1992, Romer 1990, Lucas 1993). Little is know, however, on the
process by which knowledge is created. At the heart of all knowledge-based models of growth is
the idea of knowledge externality: old knowledge makes the creation of new knowledge easier.
This feature is thought to account for persistent growth.
Because the capacity of any single individual to accumulate knowledge is limited, in practice
knowledge externalities occur thanks to the non-rival nature of knowledge. Since knowledge is
also complementary in the sense that new advances in knowledge are built upon earlier ones,
it is natural to suspect that the knowledge creation process depends to a large extent on the
mechanisms by which knowledge is shared between researchers. One key component of this
sharing of knowledge is collaborative research. Only through collaborative research can scholars
share intimate technical knowledge and bring together very specialized skills. Collaborative
research is thus likely to play a central role in the knowledge creation process. It is therefore
important to understand the factors that favor or hinder collaboration among researchers.
In this paper we study the forces that shape how collaborative research comes to be. We
take co-authorship of an academic publication as our indicator of collaborative research. While
this measure fails to capture other important forms of collaboration, such as participation in
sponsored research projects, by focusing on tangible research output it o¤ers the advantage of
being unambiguous and easy to measure. We choose to focus on economists for two fundamental
reasons. First, being economists ourselves, we feel we have a better understanding of the research
context and are better armed to draw correct inference. Second and more importantly, economics
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as a discipline has by and large resisted the temptation to include as coauthor all the members
of a research team. This stands in sharp contrast with other disciplines such as medicine or
biology where the number of coauthors is often very large and includes many people who did
not participate directly to the research. This means that co-authorship in economics is a more
accurate signal of actual pooling of knowledge and skills to produce an identiable research
output.
Using a database of all published articles in economic journals over the last 30 years, we con-
struct a dataset containing all coauthored papers published during that period. By considering
each author as a node and each co-authorship as a link between nodes, we dene a research col-
laboration network. In this work, we investigate the determinants of co-authorship. Ultimately,
these determinants a¤ect the architecture of the network, a detailed analysis of which can be
found in Goyal, van der Leij & Moraga-Gonzalez (2006)
We nd robust evidence that the creation of new coauthorships is subject to network e¤ects:
a new collaboration emerges faster if the two authors are more closely connected, either directly
or indirectly, through collaborations with others. Put di¤erently, John and Jack are more likely
to publish together if both have already published with Jill. We show that the network prox-
imity e¤ect extends quite far to include rather roundabout connections between authors. These
results are obtained even though we control for pair-wise xed e¤ects and for a number of indi-
vidual characteristics such as publication productivity, overlapping research interests, common
a¢ liation, and total number of coauthorships. We also nd that lower average productivity and
large di¤erence in productivity between authors favor co-authorship.
This paper ts in a growing literature on networks. It is increasingly recognized that some
social phenomena are best understood as taking place within networks. Sociologists and an-
thropologists have long incorporated network in their conceptual toolbox and demonstrated
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the usefulness of the concept in understanding certain market phenomena (e.g. Mitchell 1969,
Granovetter 1995). In a seminar thought piece, Granovetter (1985) argues that most if not
all economic transactions are embedded in social relationships that help shape them and are
shaped by them. Without necessarily coming as far as Granovetter, Greif (2001) and North
(2001) in their recent work of market institutions have recognized that perfect anonymity is
seldom achieved in actual market transactions  and perhaps not even desirable as it would
enable crooks to thrive. In a detailed study of market institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Fafchamps (2004) provides evidence that networks of business acquaintances play an important
role in the operation of markets. Similar empirical evidence is provided by (e.g. McMillan &
Woodru¤ 1999, Johnson, McMillan & Woodru¤ 2002, Fafchamps & Minten 2002, Fafchamps &
Minten 2001, Fafchamps 2003, Fisman 2003) and many others. In a similar vein, Fafchamps &
Lund (2003) and Dercon & de Weerdt (2002) examine the role of interpersonal networks in risk
sharing among the rural poor while Munshi (2003) studies mutual assistance among Mexican
migrant workers in the US. Gulati (1998) examines how existing social networks a¤ect the chance
of a new alliance among rms. Most of this empirical work examine the benets individuals
derive from their network of interpersonal contacts.
In the wake of these empirical advances, economic theorists have begun developing a body
of economy theory focused on networks. Following early publications by Montgomery (1991)
and Kranton (1996), recent examples of these e¤orts can be found, for instance, in the works
of Kranton & Minehart (2001), Bala & Goyal (2000), Bala & Goyal (1998), Genicot & Ray
(2003), and Bloch, Genicot & Ray (2004) on small networks. Vega-Redondo (2004) provides an
excellent survey of the theoretical literature on large networks, which is largely inspired from
the epidemiological literature. Much of this recent theoretical interest focuses on the formation
of networks on which, with the exception of Goyal, van der Leij & Moraga-Gonzalez (2006),
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Dercon & de Weerdt (2002) and Fafchamps & Gubert (2004), there is little empirical work by
economists. This paper seeks to ll this gap.
This paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework is provided in Section 2. The
testing strategy is discussed in Section 3 together with various econometric issues. The data are
presented in Section 4. Econometric analysis is summarized in Section 5.
2. Conceptual framework
We wish to understand how scientic collaborations are formed. Collaborating on a joint research
project is fraught with dangers. Researchers may have insu¢ cient information on the true
ability of a potential coauthor, or be unable to fully predict their complementarities. Even if
information problems can be solved, authors may come to disagree on the conduct of the research
or they may resent an unfair distribution of the workload. There is also a risk of free riding
or breach of promise, one author failing to provide su¢ cient input into the research venture.
Because it is di¢ cult if not impossible for an external party to assess researchersinput, joint
research contracts are basically unenforceable by courts. Informal enforcement is the rule and
probably rests on a combination of ethics, repeated interaction and reputational sanctions (e.g.
Platteau 1994, Greif 1993).
In an environment characterized by asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement, it
is natural to expect interpersonal relationships to matter because they convey information and
facilitate enforcement (e.g. Granovetter 1995, Fafchamps 2004). In particular, it is reasonable
to expect two researchers must know each other personally before they can collaborate: there
are no anonymous collaborations. Our rst assumption is thus that prior acquaintance is a
necessary condition for collaboration. In particular we investigate whether information about
previous coauthorship circulates through a network of professional acquaintances. If this is the
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case, researchers who share coauthors are more likely to collaborate in the future. Testing this
idea is the main purpose of this paper.
Prior acquaintance is not a su¢ cient condition for collaboration. In economics, it is always
possible for a researcher to publish alone. Since collaboration is voluntary, parties to a scientic
collaboration must expect more from working with together than what they could achieve in
isolation. Our second assumption is thus that two researchers collaborate only if it is in their
mutual interest at the time. Having outlined our two main assumptions, we now examine them
in turn. We rst model the factors a¤ecting gains from collaboration before turning to the
acquaintance process.
2.1. Scientic collaboration
In economics, scientic collaboration towards publication in a refereed journal takes the form of
a work team created for a specic task. Success depends on the type of each researcher their
ability, experience, availability, and willingness to exert e¤ort and on the complementarity in
their skills and interests. Since scientic collaboration is voluntary, it is natural to assume that
two researchers collaborate if it is in their mutual interest.
To illustrate the factors inuencing the decision to collaborate, we construct a simple model
of research collaboration. We begin by postulating a research production function that relates
the anticipated quality of joint research output Rij to the e¤ort e and ability a of researchers i
and j:
Rij = r(ei; ej ; ai; aj)
We assume that function r(:) is strictly increasing in all its arguments.
Each researcher is assumed to derive utility (and possibly other compensation in the form
of salary or job promotion) from the quality of his or her research output. The utility derived
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by i from a collaboration with j is thus:
ij = kRij = kr(ei; ej ; ai; aj)
where 12  k  1 expresses the proportion of research output Rij attributed to i by his or her
peers. Researcher i compares the value of collaborating with j as against the possible returns
from working with others and alone. Suppose that this outside option is given by R(E; ai),
where E is the total e¤ort/time available to i, and ai is his ability. Then researcher i chooses
e¤ort ei in joint project with j to solve:
max
eiji
U i = kr(ei; ej ; ai; aj) + R(E   ei; 0; ai; 0)
which yields rst order condition of the form:
k
@r(ei; ej ; ai; aj)
@ei
=
@ R(E   ei; ai)
@ei
(2.1)
Equation (2.1) implicitly denes an optimal choice of e¤ort given respective abilities and the
e¤ort provided by the coauthor. Combining rst order conditions for the two coauthors denes
the Nash equilibrium level of collaborative e¤ort ei and e

j .
We now consider a number of special cases to illustrate some important factors a¤ecting the
decision to collaborate. The central concern of our analysis is the determinants of collaboration.
An important determinant of collaboration is clearly the ability of the potential collaborator.
We focus on the interaction between e¤ort and ability in shaping the collaboration decision.
Collaboration among authors of similar ability: If the abilities of individuals improve the quality
of research, there is a natural pressure towards individuals wanting to collaborate with others of
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higher ability. The following example illustrates this intuition. Suppose research output takes
the form r = ai + aj . This corresponds to the case where pooling abilities raises the quality of
the research project. Here e¤ort does not matter and can thus be ignored. In this setting an
individual either chooses to work with j or to take an outside option given by (say) ai. Author
i prefers to collaborate whenever:
k(ai + aj) > ai
and similarly for author j. If authors are of equal ability, i.e. if ai = aj , collaboration is optimal
whenever k  12 . This is intuitive: since pooling abilities raises research quality, it is optimal for
researchers to collaborate as long as they receive su¢ cient credit for their joint work.
If authors are of unequal ability, collaborating is always attractive for the weaker author but
need not be in the interest of the more able author. For instance, if aj = 0, then i prefers not
to collaborate for any k < 1. In general collaboration is optimal if and only if:
aj
ai
>
1  k
k
For instance, if k = 2=3, then js ability must at least be equal to half of is. In such a world,
there is assortative matching: collaboration takes place between authors of similar ability level.
So far we have assumed that authors are fully complementary so that there is no overlap
in their abilities. To allow for overlap, let each individual ability be made of two components:
one that is shared by both authors, denoted aij , and one that is specic to each author. The
condition for is collaboration now is:
k(ai + aj + aij) > ai + aij
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which is satised whenever:
aj
ai + aij
>
1  k
k
It follows that if author j brings no special ability to the collaboration i.e., if aj = 0 then the
higher ability author i refuses to collaborate for an k < 1. This is also true even if author i has
no special ability either i.e., if ai = 0. This shows that collaboration is more likely between
authors whose abilities are complementary, that is, for whom the overlap in competence aij is a
small component of their total ability.
To summarize, we have shown that if research output depends only on ability, collaboration
is most likely between authors of a similar level of ability (assortative matching) but with non-
overlapping competences (complementarity in competences). The above argument suggests that
we should not expect to see much collaboration between researchers of very di¤erent abilities.
We now examine whether this conclusion is also valid if we incorporate e¤ort levels in the model.
Collaboration among authors with dissimilar ability: The example below explores the following
idea: collaboration between high and low ability authors can arise if the low ability author
provides more e¤ort. In this manner the time-constrained high ability author can produce more
research while the low ability researcher produces better quality output.
Suppose that research output takes the simple form:
Rij = (ai + aj + aij)r(ei + ej)
where aij , as before, represents overlapping ability and we assume decreasing returns to e¤ort,
i.e., r00 < 0. Suppose also that (ai + aij) R(x) is the return from allocating e¤ort x 2 [0; E]
to research alone. To simplify the exposition we assume that author j has no special ability 
aj = 0.
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We begin by showing that, compared to i, author j allocates more e¤ort to joint research
than to own research. This is because e¤ort on the joint research project is more productive for j
thanks to is high ability. Formally, when the authors collaborate we have rst order conditions
of the form:
k(ai + aij)r
0(ei + ej) = (ai + aij) R0(E   ej) for i
k(ai + aij)r
0(ei + ej) = aij R0(E   ei) for j
from which we obtain:
R0(E   ei)
R0(E   ej) =
ai + aij
aij
(2.2)
Equation (2.2) shows that the marginal return to e¤ort is higher for i than for j, which
implies that ei < ej since r00 < 0 by assumption. We also see that the ratio
ej
ei
is increasing in ai:
the larger the ability gap between the two authors, the more unequally e¤ort is divided between
them. Using the rst order conditions, it can also be shown that ei is decreasing in ej : author
i provides less e¤ort if j provides more.
We now ask whether collaboration takes place. The high ability author prefers to collaborate
if:
k(ai + aij)r(ei + ej) + (ai + aij) R(E   ei) > (ai + aij) R(E)
, kr(ei + ej) + R(E   ei) > R(E) (2.3)
The low ability author prefers to collaborate so long as
k(ai + aij)r(ei + ej) + (aij) R(E   ej) > (aij) R(E) (2.4)
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It is immediately clear that as long as ej > 0 condition (2.3) is satised for ei small enough:
author i gets the benet of an additional output without having to invest much e¤ort. Clearly,
the low ability author will prefer collaboration to the outside option for small values of ai;j .
Furthermore, from the rst order condition (2.2) we see that ej increases in ai, and so from
equations (2.3)-(2.4) it follows that the likelihood of collaboration increases in ai. Given that
aj = 0 this means that the likelihood of collaboration increases in the ability di¤erence between
the two authors.
Letmij denote the likelihood that i and j collaborate given their type. If only ability matters,
we expect assortative matching with researchers of similar quality working together: mij is
decreasing in the absolute di¤erence between the ability of researchers i and j. If e¤ort matters
as well, dissimilar matching can arise whereby a researcher with high ability or experience 
teams up with a less able or less experienced researcher who provides much of the grunt work.
In that case, mij is increasing in the absolute di¤erence between their abilities.
2.2. Matching and referral
We have seen that the likelihood of collaboration between two researchers depends on their type.
In order to initiate a collaborative research project, however, two researchers rst have to meet.
One possibility is that researchers purposefully introduce themselves to those with whom they
wish to collaborate. In this case the probability of collaborating simply depends on the mutual
gains from collaborating: P ijt = m
ij
t .
For purposive matching to be feasible, type must be perfectly observable to all at little or
no cost.1 The model presented in the previous sub-section makes it clear that researchers have
an incentive to overstate their ability in order to attract either high ability or hard working
1Assuming information processing can be done at reasonable cost: at any moment in time there are tens of
thousands of economists actively publishing in refereed journals.
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collaborators, depending on the kind of assortative matching.2 If researchers can dissimulate
their type, purposive matching is not feasible.
Another possibility is that authors are matched with each other according to some random
process. They then observe each others type, possibly at a cost, and decide whether to col-
laborate or not.3 Let r denote an exogenously given matching probability and assume that,
conditional on having met, two researchers i and j collaborate with a probability mijt  1. With
these assumptions, the probability of collaboration between an arbitrary pair of authors i and j
is:
P ijt = m
ij
t r (2.5)
Such a system is not very e¢ cient because screening has to take place for each potential pair of
researchers. Since the total number of researchers is extremely large, the scope for duplication
is enormous and the cost of search is very high, making it very unlikely that an e¢ cient match
will obtain. A more e¢ cient outcome would arise if information about type circulates among
researchers.
To model the information circulation process, we imagine a world in which researchers are
introduced or referred to each other by common acquaintances. We assume that valuable
information about type is conveyed, in both directions, by the referral process.4 The literature
has shown that referrals play an important role in matching workers and employers (Granovetter
1995). It is natural to expect referrals to play a similarly important role in matching researchers.
In such a world, prior acquaintance matters: if i can be referred to j and vice versa, they have
2Even if ability and experience are perfectly observable, for instance through the publication record, researchers
still have an incentive to underreport the number of collaborations in which they are involved, a point we did not
discuss formally in the previous section but that follows immediately from the model.
3This process resembles the market formation process discussed in Fafchamps (2002).
4Here we do not model explicitly why accurate information is conveyed by the common acquaintance, but we
can imagine that the referral game is embedded in a web of long-term relationships that serves to deter incorrect
referral.
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more chance of starting a scientic collaboration.
It is natural to assume that collaborating with someone reveals valuable information about
their ability and motivation. It follows that a referral about a researcher i is particularly in-
formative when it is provided by a previous coauthor of i. Referral by a coauthor can thus be
construed as a vetting process, stating whether a coauthor is competent and can be trusted to
do his or her share of the work.
To formalize these ideas, let St be the set of active researchers at time t. For the purpose of
this paper, a researcher is considered active from the moment of his or her rst publication. Some
pairs of researchers have coauthored with each other, some are not. We describe the pattern
of coauthorship as a graph in which each author is a node and each mutual acquaintance is a
link between two nodes. Formally, let lijt = 1 if at or before time t researchers i and j have
coauthored with each other, and lijt = 0 otherwise. The set of all i 2 St and lijt forms the graph
Gt. Because authors enter and exit and links are added as a result of joint publication, the
graph changes over time.
To formalize the referral process, consider two authors i and j. Suppose that authors i
and j share a common coauthor k. In the parlance of network theory, the network distance
(or shortest path) dijt between i and j in the coauthorship network is equal to 2. Assume
that with probability b < 1 author k refers i and j to each other. Conditional on having
been introduced, the researchers collaborate with probability mijt  1. The probability P ijt of
observing a collaboration between i and j at time t is thus:
P ijt = Pr(i introduced to j) Pr(i collaborates with jji introduced to j)
= bmijt
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Now suppose instead that the shortest path between i and j is of size 3: i has coauthored
with k, j has coauthored with l, and l and k have coauthored with each other. Continue to
assume that with probability b author k introduces coauthor i to coauthor l. Further assume
that l in turn introduces i to his coauthor j, also with probability b. In this case we have:
P ijt = b
2mijt
Generalizing the above example, it follows that along any path of length dijt the probability of
i and j of being referred to each other is bd
ij
t  1.
So far we have focused on a single network path between i and j. In practice, there might
be multiple paths linking them. Consider Figure 1, for instance. There are four paths linking i
to j, but they share a common segment kl. We want to nd out the value of P ijt in this case.
Let us assume that with probability b, each node refers i to the next node along each path
originating from it. This means that nodes a; b; c; k and d each refer i once to the next node
with probability b while node l refers him to both c and d, in each case with probability b. The
same thing happens in the other direction regarding j:With these assumptions, the probability
of i and j being referred to each other is 2bb (b2+b2) = 4b2, that is, to bd 1  the number of
paths. It can be veried that this example generalizes to all congurations. The total probability
of observing a collaboration between i and j at t can thus be written:
P ijt = m
ij
t
1X
d=2
Cijt (d)b
d 1 (2.6)
= mijt C
ij
t (d
ij
t )b
dijt  1 +mijt
1X
d=dijt +1
Cijt (d)b
d 1 (2.7)
where Cijt (d) denotes the number of paths of length d between i and j.
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In practice, calculating all possible paths at all distances is an extremely cumbersome process
for a network as large as the one we are studying. A closer inspection of (2.6) reveals that the
term bd 1 falls rapidly with distance provided that b is small. If Cijt (d) does not increase too
rapidly with distance, the value of P ijt is determined primarily by the rst term b
dijt  1 where as
before dijt is the shortest path between i and j. In this case, P
ij
t can be approximated by:
P ijt  mijt cijt bd
ij
t  1 (2.8)
where we have dened cijt = C
ij
t (d
ij
t ), that is, c
ij
t is the number of shortest paths between i and
j.
Equation (2.8) forms the basis of our testing strategy. If coauthorship networks serve to
introduce potential coauthors to each other and a referral is a prerequisite for collaboration, we
should observe a relationship of the form depicted by (2.8). For estimation purposes, equation
(2.8) is estimated using logit. It is then useful to derive the logit functional form that best
corresponds to (2.8). The logit regression takes the form:
P ijt =
eX
ij
t
1 + eX
ij
t
(2.9)
We want to know how to write X ijt . We begin by noting that, for P
ij
t small as is the case in
our data equation (2.9) is approximatively equal to:
P ijt  eX
ij
t = mijt c
ij
t b
dijt  1
14
Taking logs, we obtain:
X ijt =   log b+ log b(dijt ) + log cijt + logmijt (2.10)
We thus need to estimate a logit model in which the regressors are the length of the shortest
path, which enters linearly, the number of shortest paths, and logmijt . The dependent variable
takes value 1 if i and j collaborate and 0 otherwise. Equation (2.10) predicts that the coe¢ cient
of dijt is the log of unknown probability b and the coe¢ cient of log c
ij
t should be 1.
In contrast, if referral does not matter  either because information circulates freely or
because researchers screen each other directly then equation (2.5) applies5 and the model boils
down to
X ijt =   log r + logmijt
Testing network referral thus boils down to testing whether the coe¢ cients of dijt and log c
ij
t are
signicant.
So far we have assumed that referral information only circulates between coauthors. This is
probably too restrictive. We now discuss what happens if we relax this assumption and allow
referrals to circulate more broadly. Suppose there exists a network of personal acquaintance
among economists. In this network, a link exists between i and j if i and j know each other well
enough to transmit accurate and trustworthy information about other researcherstype. This
network is denser  i.e., has more links  than the coauthorship network but, and this is the
important point, it includes it since people who have coauthored a paper together by denition
know each other.6 Other assumptions remain unchanged.
5 In the case of purposive matching, we simply have r = 1.
6This need not be the case in other sciences where the number of authors on a single paper can be very large.
But for economics it is a reasonable assumption.
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We have seen that the probability that two researchers are referred to each other is a de-
creasing function of the network distance between them. Let dija and d
ij
c denote the shortest
path between i and j in the acquaintance and coauthorship networks, respectively. Dene cija
and cijc similarly. Dropping time and individual subscripts to improve readability, we now have
P  mcabda 1 and hence:
X =   log b+ log b(da) + log ca + logm
We observe dc but we do not observe da. However, dc provides some useful information
regarding da. Since the coauthorship network is included in the acquaintance network, we have:
da  dc
Consequently, the lower dc is, the lower da must be. To illustrate this, Figure 2 presents the
unconditional distribution of f(da). Observation dc provides an upper bound statistic on da. The
conditional distribution of da is the truncated distribution below dc. It follows that E[dajda  dc]
increases with dc, as shown in the Figure. Put di¤erently, dc provides information about unknown
da since the average value of unobserved da increases monotonically with observed dc. We can
therefore regard dc as a valid proxy variable for da (Wooldridge 2002). The requirement is that
dc not be so much above the distribution of da that @E[dajda  dc]=@dc ! 0 . This is illustrate
in Figure 1 where we see that as dc increases, E[dajda  dc] ! E[da]. To summarize, if we
regress P ij on dijc and nd a signicant relationship, this means that network referral matters.
If we do not nd a signicant relationship, it could be either because there is none or because
our proxy variable is too crude.
Next we note that the information content of dc increases as dc falls. This is because as dc
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falls, the conditional distribution of da gets squeezedaround its lower bound (the lowest value
of da = 1 when the two researchers are already acquainted). A contrario, when dc is large, e.g.,
well above the distribution of da, it conveys little if any information about the likely value of
da. The di¤erence between da and dc thus falls with dc. Put di¤erently, dc becomes a better
measure of da at low values of dc. Consequently, we expect measurement error bias to be smaller
at small values of dc.7 This can be investigated by regressing P ij on a series of dummy variables,
one for each value of dc. We expect dummy coe¢ cients to be strongest and most signicant at
low values of dc while coe¢ cients should be negligible and non-signicant for values of dc above
a certain threshold.
Turning to the number of paths, we also note that cc constitutes an imperfect measure of
ca. To see this, note that if dc = da then ca  cc: if the coauthorship distance is the same as
acquaintance distance, then the number of paths between i and j in the coauthorship network
provides a lower bound for the number of paths in the acquaintance network. We have seen
that the likelihood that dc = da increases at low values of dc. Combining the two observations,
it follows that cc constitutes a proxy variable for ca and that the accuracy of this proxy variable
is higher at low values of dc. If, however, referrals only circulate via the coauthorship network,
then equation (2.10) is the correct model and there is not attenuation bias as dc increases.
This suggests a way of testing whether referrals only circulate in the coauthorship network.
Add an interaction term of the form distance  log cc to equation (2.10). If the coauthorship
network is embedded inside a denser acquaintance network, attenuation bias implies that the
coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negative: cc becomes a worse proxy for ca as dc increases. If
referral circulates only in the coauthorship network, then the interaction terms is non-signicant.
7 In the univariate linear case y =  + x + v, it can be shown that p lim b =  1
1+2v=
2
x
where 2v is the
variance of the measurement error, 2x is the variance of the true regressor (without measurement error), and 
is the true coe¢ cient of x. This shows that the bias in b falls when 2v falls: the less measurement error, the less
bias there is.
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3. Testing strategy
We have seen in the previous section that the likelihood that two researchers collaborate depends
on characteristics such as ability and skill complementarities. In addition, we argued that two
researchers must know each other before they can collaborate. To the extent that referral
circulates through interpersonal networks, network proximity is expected to a¤ect the likelihood
that two researchers begin collaborating with each other. Once they have begun collaborating,
however, referral no longer matters and subsequent collaborations should thus depend exclusively
on mijt . This constitutes the basis for our testing strategy. In this section we describe how
estimation and identication problems are dealt with.
Let St denote the set of active researchers at time t. For the purpose of this paper, a
researcher is considered active from the moment of his or her rst publication. At time t, each
researcher i 2 St can potentially coauthor an article with any other researcher j 2 St. Let yijt
be a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if authors i and j publish a article together in year t,
and 0 otherwise. The collection of yijt can be represented as a graph or network Nt where each
author is a node and each co-authorship is a link.
We wish to investigate whether the likelihood of co-authorship falls with network distance,
that is, whether authors who are closer in the co-authorship network and who share more
common coauthors are more likely to begin publishing together. Formally, we want to test
whether, conditional yijt s = 0 for all s, the likelihood that y
ij
t = 1 increases in d
ij
t and c
ij
t , i.e.,
whether for rst collaborations:
Pr(yijt = 1jyijt s = 0 for all s  1) = f(dijt ; cijt ;mijt ) (3.1)
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with @f=@d > 0 and @f=@c > 0. For subsequent collaborations, we write:
Pr(yijt = 1jyijt s = 1 for some s  1) = g(dijt ; cijt ;mijt ) (3.2)
If network e¤ects capture referral, we expect that @g=@d = 0 and @g=@c = 0 since once two
researchers have collaborated referral is no longer necessary. Estimating equations (3.1) and
(3.2) is the objective of this paper.
For estimation of (3.1) to yield meaningful inference about network e¤ects, we must control
for factors that could create a false correlation between yijt and d
ij
t or c
ij
t . Our biggest concern
is unobserved heterogeneity. Researchers choose to work together because they share common
interests or complementary abilities. Since skill complementarity is specic to each pair of
researchers, meaningful inference requires that we control for a pairwise-specic xed e¤ect ij .
The models to be estimated are of the form:
Pr(yijt = 1jyijt s = 0 for all s  1) = f(dijt ; cijt ;mijt ; ij) (3.3)
Pr(yijt = 1jyijt s = 1 for some s  1) = g(dijt ; cijt ;mijt ; ij) (3.4)
where ij is a xed e¤ect corresponding to each researcher pair. Fixed e¤ect controls for many
possible time-invariant determinants of scientic collaboration, such as innate ability, education,
gender, ethnicity, date and place of birth, etc. Only time-vaying regressors dijt , c
ij
t and m
ij
t are
identied.8
8For equation (3.3), variation in duration is essential to identication. To see why, imagine a contrario that
all collaborations happen in two periods. In a xed e¤ect logit context, each observation has likelihood function:
Pr(yij0 = 0; y
ij
1 = 1) =
e+p
ij
2 +c
ij
2
e+p
ij
1 +c
ij
1 + e+p
ij
2 +c
ij
2
Since, by construction, all collaborations take place in period 2, all likelihood functions have the same form. From
this, it is immediately obvious that the only identiable parameter is , the constant term.
By contrast, imagine that some collaborations take place in two periods, with the likelihood above, while others
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We estimate equations (3.3) and (3.4) using a xed e¤ect logit estimator. Doing so raises
a well known identication problem. Both equations are equivalent to duration models with
xed e¤ects, except that they are estimated in discrete time. It is well known that in single
spell duration models duration dependence and xed e¤ects cannot be separately estimated.9
In practice this means that we cannot include time e¤ects in equations (3.3) and (3.4) since
duration dependence is subsumed in the xed e¤ect.
Estimation of the rst collaboration model (3.3) raises an additional di¢ culty that has been
noted by Allison & Christakis (2005). To understand the problem, assume that both authors
begin publishing at time t0 and coauthor their rst paper together at time t1. This means that
yijt = 0 for all t 2 [t0; t1) and yijt = 1 for t = t1. Thus for each pair ij the time sequence of
dependent variables takes the form yij = f0; :::; 0; 1g. The only thing that varies across pairs
is the number of 0 observations. This mecanically generates a spurious correlation between the
dependent variable and any regressor that exhibits a time trend. The nature of the problem is
illustrated in Appendix using a Monte Carlo simulation.
The solution we adopt is to eliminate any time trend in the regressors by detrending them.
This is achieved by rst regressing each regressor on a pairwise-specic xed e¤ect and a lin-
ear time trend. Residuals from this regression are then used in (3.3) in lieu of the original
regressors.10 In Appendix we show that this method yields consistent estimates.
take place after three periods with likelihood of the form:
Pr(yij0 = 0; y
ij
1 = 0; y
ij
2 = 1) =
e+p
ij
2 +c
ij
2
e+p
ij
0 +c
ij
0 + e+p
ij
1 +c
ij
1 + e+p
ij
2 +c
ij
2
Identication of  and  is obtained by combining both types of observations.
9 Identication is possible in multiple spell duration models when the xed e¤ect is the same across time
(Chamberlain 1985). In our case, however, we expect the xed e¤ect to be di¤erent for rst and subsequent
collaborations. This is because at the time of rst collaboration both researchers only have limited information
about each other but are better informed when deciding whether to continue collaborating. For this reason we
estimate rst collaboration and subsequent collaborations separately.
10We also apply this procedure to model (3.4) even though in this case correction is not required since the
dependent variable does not exhibit any systematic time trend. As we will see in this case detrending does not
a¤ect results much.
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4. The data
The data used for this paper come from the Econlit data base, compiled by the editors of the
Journal of Economic Literature. The data base contains information on all articles published in
economic journals between 1969 and 1999. Only limited information is available on each paper.
We use this database to construct the variables of interest as follows.
4.1. Denition of variables
We begin by discussing how variables measuring network proximity and ability are constructed.
The co-authorship variable yijt is dened as follows. Suppose authors i and j coauthor a paper
in year tij1 . We create a variable y
ij
t that takes value 1 at t
ij
1 and 0 otherwise. To determine
whether i and j are active at time t 6= tij1 , we look in the database for the earliest year of
publication for each author separately, say ti0 and t
j
0. We then dene t
ij
0 = maxfti0; tj0g. We thus
have yijt = 0 for all t
ij
0  t < tij1 and yijt = 1 for t = tij1 . We proceed similarly for subsequent
joint publications. For instance, suppose i and j publish another paper at time tij2 . We then let
yijt = 0 for all t
ij
1 < t < t
ij
2 and y
ij
t = 1 at t = t
ij
2 .
Our main regressor of interest is network distance dijt between i and j that is, the shortest
path between i and j in the coauthorship network. To construct dijt , we proceed as follows. We
begin by constructing the coauthorship network Nt using authors as nodes and coauthorships
as network links and including all publications from year t   10 until t   1. The reason for
combining 10 years of publications is that the e¤ect of network proximity on co-authorship does
not die o¤ instantaneously.11 Since 10 years of data are necessary to construct Nt, observations
from 1969 to 1979 cannot be used in the regression analysis.
11We experimented with di¤erent time lags and found a 10 year window to yield stable results. The lag is
long enough to allow memory but at the same time it is su¢ ciently short to ensure enough observations to allow
estimation.
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Having obtained the coauthorship network, we compute the shortest network distance dijt
from i to j in Nt. For instance, if i and j have both published with k, then d
ij
t = 2. Variable c
ij
t
is the number of shortest paths between i and j in Nt; it is 0 if i and j are unconnected. When
computing the distance from i to j, any direct link between i and j is ignored.
If i were j are not connected, i.e., if there was no chain of coauthors leading from i to j in
the 10 years prior to t, then dijt is not dened (it is de facto innite). For this reason, we nd it
easier to work with the inverse of distance, which we call network proximity pijt dened as:
pijt =
1
dijt
By construction, pijt varies between 0 and 1=2. It is 0:5 if i and j share a common coauthor and
it is 0 if i and j are unconnected.12 Variable pijt is the distance measure used in the estimation
of equation (3.3) and (3.4).
Turning to mijt , we begin by noting that xed e¤ects capture most individual or pairwise
factors that might a¤ect the likelihood of forming a scientic collaboration, such as having
gone to the same graduate school, having similar abilities, or sharing common interests. We
nevertheless recognize that certain elements of mijt may change over time, such as research
interests and productivity. For instance, we expect research productivity to increase as the
beginning of a researchers career and to fall as retirement approaches. To capture this idea, we
look at the publication record of each author i and j.
The number of published papers is an important but imperfect measure of a researchers
productivity. The quality of research also matters. To construct a simple quality-corrected
index of research productivity qijt , we make use of the point system developed by the Tinbergen
Institute in the Netherlands for its tenuring process. According to this system, each journal is
12Since own link is ignored in the computation of dijt , p
ij
t never takes the value 1.
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given a number of points. Publishing in the top rank journals, for instance, yields four points,
compared to 1 point for a low rank journal. Publishing in intermediate journals yield 2 or 3
points. Tenure decisions are taken based on the number of points a researcher has accumulated.
We mimic this process for all authors in our database. For each author variable qit is simply the
number of points author i has earned at year t.
Unlike network distance dijt , which is a characteristic of a link or pair, research output q
i
t
is author-specic. Here we encounter a practical di¢ cult that arises in all symmetric (undirec-
tional) network regressions: since both authors occupy a symmetrical position in the coauthor
pair, regressors must not depend on the order of indexation. This means that the same regres-
sors must obtain if we reverse the order of i and j. There are several equivalent ways of dealing
with this di¢ culty.13 Here we simply choose the mean and the absolute di¤erence:
qijt 
qit + q
j
t
2
qijt 
qit   qjt 
Variables qijt and q
ij
t capture research productivity e¤ects as follows. If producers of a large
quantity of high quality research are attractive research partners for each other, the coe¢ cient
of qijt will be positive and signicant. In contrast, if highly productive researchers nd that
they are more productive on their own, qijt will have a negative coe¢ cient. If coauthorship is
dominated by assortative matching, the coe¢ cient of qijt should be negative and signicant:
the more dissimilar the authors become, the less likely they are to collaborate. In contrast, if
junior-senior collaborations dominate, we expect the coe¢ cient of qijt to be positive: the more
dissimilar the authors, the more likely they are to collaborate.
13Sociologists, for instance, have proposed using the di¤erence and absolute di¤erence between the character-
istics of i and j.
23
To control for changes in research interests, we use the JEL codes contained in the database
to dene an index of overlapping interests !ijt . We categorize the articles into 19 subelds
corresponding to the rst digit of the JEL codes14. If for an article multiple JEL codes are
given, then this article is dividedand assigned proportionally to the corresponding elds15.
The index is then constructed as follows. Suppose that xit;f is the fraction of articles written by
i in eld f in the period from t   10 to t   1 (such that Pf xit;f = 1). We then consider the
following measure of eld overlap between i and j in year t:
!ijt =
P
f x
i
t;fx
j
t;frP
f (x
i
t;f )
2
P
f (x
j
t;f )
2

This measure ranges from 0 if i and j did not write any paper in the same eld, to 1 if i and
j wrote in exactly the same elds and in exactly the same proportion. Together, !ijt , q
ij
t and
qijt measure changes in the gains from potential collaboration m
ij
t .
4.2. Controls
Since one of our main objectives is to identify the e¤ect of the coauthorship network on the
likelihood of doing collaborative research, it is important that we control for factors that may
a¤ect the likelihood of coauthorthip and be correlated with network distance. Most of these
factors are captured by the pairwise xed e¤ect, but some time-varying e¤ects remain a cause
for concern, notably variation in individual network size and changes in a¢ liation.
Some researchers have a higher propensity to collaborate than others. To the extent that
this trait is time-invariant, it is captured in the xed e¤ect. But a researchers propensity
14The JEL classication changed in 1990. For articles before 1990 we matched old JEL codes to new JEL codes
on the basis of the code descriptions. A correspondence table between old and new JEL codes can be obtained
from the authors on request.
15To give an example, if for one article the JEL codes A10, A21 and B31 are given, then 2/3 of the article is
assigned to eld A, while 1/3 of the article is assigned to eld B.
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to collaborate may also vary over time: as authors build up co-authoring links with a large
number of other authors, new collaboration opportunities probably arise at a higher rate. A
researchers network of past collaborators may thus measure a time-varying propensity to col-
laborate. Because authors with many collaborators have a higher degree in the coauthorship
network, their distance to other authors is on average smaller. This may generate a spurious
correlation between changes in network distance and coauthorship.
To capture this e¤ect, we calculate the total number of coauthors nit of author i, computed
over the ten years preceding time t, and similarly for author j. Because of symmetry, we
transform nit and n
j
t in the same fashion as we did for q
i
t and q
j
t , that is, we compute their mean
nijt and absolute di¤erence n
ij
t .
The propensity to collaborate may also vary with departmental or employer a¢ liation: close
physical proximity may bring researchers together or it may pull them apart as they seek to
distinguish themselves from their colleagues. If researchers collaborate primarily with colleagues,
network proximity may simply capture common a¢ liation. It is therefore important to control
for a¢ liation. Oyer (2005) has shown that economists who start their academic career in a
better deparment have a higher research productivity. This may in part be due to contacts
junior researchers form with colleagues.
The JEL database contains information about author a¢ liation, but only after 1989 and
occasionally 1988. Moreover the data is spotty and incomplete.16 It is nevertheless informative
to test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of a¢ liation data.
We construct common a¢ liation variables as follows. Let F it be the set of all a¢ liations of
author i that are mentioned in is articles published in year t. Note that F it will be empty if i
16A¢ liation data is recorded as strings. Much time was invested cleaning the data, for instance to correct
spelling mistakes, and di¤erences in language, and irrelevant name variation e.g., U Harvard or University of
Harvard. The bulk of our data cleaning e¤ort was devoted to ensure that individuals coming from the same
university are identied as having the same a¢ liation.
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did not publish in year t or if no a¢ liations were mentioned. To ll these empty gaps, we dene
eF it =
8>><>>:
F it if F
i
t 6= ;
eF it 1 if F it = ;:
This denition of an authors a¢ liation assumes that an authors a¢ liation remains unchanged
until information to the contrary is given. The common a¢ liation variable, f ijt , is then dened
as follows. If both eF it 1 and eF jt 1 are non-empty, then
f ijt =
8>><>>:
1 if eF it 1 \ eF jt 1 6= ;
0 if eF it 1 \ eF jt 1 = ;:
If either eF it 1 or eF jt 1 is missing, then f ijt is missing as well. Observations for the common
a¢ liation variable start only in 1988. Including a¢ liation data seriously reduces panel length,
making estimation more problematic and weakening inference.
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for all variables of interest are displayed in Table 1. The rst panel the
Table presents summary statistics for the data up to the rst collaboration, while the second
panel presents statistics for the data after the rst collaboration. In the rst columns we show
summary statistics for all authors. This includes many authors who have published relatively lit-
tle and appear infrequently in the EconLit database. To capture actively publishing economists,
we drop all authors with fewer than 20 publications in the whole database and we recompute
all statistics. These are presented at the right of the Table.
We focus rst on data up to the rst collaboration. The duration to the rst collaboration
is 5 years on average 9 years when we limit the sample to actively publishing economists. The
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the data
Variable Description All authors Authors with > 20 papers
Mean Std.Dev. Max Mean Std.Dev. Max
Number of pairs 37418 3821
Number of observations 344085 59515
Data before rst collaboration
Number of observations 163306 24719
tij1   tij0 Duration to rst collab. 4.83 4.80 20 9.11 5.49 20
pijt Proximity .086 .133 .5 .131 .148 .5
Pr(pijt > 0) Connected .426 .494 1 .616 .486 1
dijt jpijt > 0 Distance if connected 3.01 4.24 35 4.04 4.19 25
cijt Number of shortest paths .897 1.791 69 1.28 1.91 34
nijt Avg. degree 3.18 2.62 30 4.87 3.36 30
nijt Dif. in degree 3.32 3.71 47 4.13 3.91 40
qijt Avg. productivity 6.32 10.63 187.25 13.75 15.85 187.25
qijt Dif. in productivity 8.99 15.64 282.33 16.74 21.71 265.67
!ijt Field overlap .489 .352 1 .534 .320 1
f ijt Common a¢ liation .215 .411 1 .176 .381 1
Data after rst collaboration
Number of observations 180779 34796
yijt Subsequent collaboration .146 .353 1 .146 .354 1
pijt Proximity .278 .221 .5 .334 .187 .5
Pr(pijt > 0) Connected .721 .449 1 .906 .292 1
dijt jpijt > 0 Distance if connected 2.43 2.91 30 2.92 2.73 23
cijt Number of shortest paths 1.038 .562 35 1.105 .810 29
nijt Avg. degree 5.80 3.57 39 8.86 4.19 39
nijt Dif. in degree 4.13 4.30 46 5.05 4.62 43
qijt Avg. productivity 7.64 12.58 209.33 15.38 17.80 209.33
qijt Dif. in productivity 8.99 16.17 282.33 16.48 21.68 282.33
!ijt Field overlap .714 .259 1 .685 .260 1
f ijt Common a¢ liation .257 .437 1 .212 .409 1
27
di¤erence reects the fact that the careers of active economists are longer, and therefore they
have more collaborations initiated later in their career.
Network proximity prior to the rst collaboration is .086 on average, which is rather small.
This corresponds to an average of 11 degrees of separation between authors in Nt. The probabil-
ity of being (indirectly) connected before the rst collaboration is 42%. The number of shortest
paths is on average less than 1. Thus, in most cases there is no path or only a single shortest
path between the two economists. Active economists are on average closer in terms of network
proximity: pijt is larger on average and Pr(p
ij
t > 0) is larger as well. This is normal since, by
denition, active authors have a higher degree in the co-authorship network and thus have a
larger network.
When connected, authors are rather close, with an average distance of 3 (i.e., 2 degrees of
separation). This is a remarkably short distance. For instance, Goyal, van der Leij & Moraga-
Gonzalez (2006) found that the average degree of separation of all connected pairs is around 8
to 12 in the co-author network. Hence, the summary statistics tell us that the network distance
is much smaller for pairs that eventually start a collaboration. This suggests that collaboration
is associated with closenessin the network.
Productivity and connectedness variables are shown next. We see that for the average author
in our database the average number of past coauthors is fairly large. As could be expected, the
average is much higher nearly twice for actively publishing economists. The average di¤erence
in connectedness is also quite large. This suggests that, as predicted by the model, certain
authors adopt a strategy whereby they seek many collaborations with authors who co-author
articles with few people.
The average value of the research productivity index is shown in next two rows of Table 1. We
nd a large average di¤erence between authors, suggesting that at the time of rst collaboration,
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authors di¤er widely in terms of productivity. This is true even if we limit the sample to pairs
of coauthors who, over the entire span of the EconLit database, have published a lot. This
constitutes prima facie evidence of dissimilar matching, that is, that many rst collaborations
take place between senior and junior authors to take advantage of complementarities between
them.
Statistics on eld overlap and common a¢ liation are presented next. Field overlap is around
50%, suggesting that most economists collaborate with someone in their eld. Around 20%
of economists had a common a¢ liation at some point during the 10 years prior to their rst
collaboration. Actively publishing researchers have a slightly higher eld overlap and less often
a common a¢ liation. This last nding might be due to greater travel opportunities for senior
authors, making it easier for them to establish contacts outside their own department.
The second panel of Table 1 presents similar information for subsequent collaborations. We
observe that authors repeat their collaboration in 15% of the years that follow their rst joint
publication. When we compare other variables in the lower panel to the variables in the upper
panel we observe that authors get closer after the rst collaboration. Field overlap and the
likelihood of a common a¢ liation also increase. Collaboration thus seems to bring co-authors
closer in terms of network and a¢ liation.
5. Econometric results
5.1. First collaboration
We now turn to the estimation of our models. We begin with equation (3.3) which analyses the
determinants of the rst collaboration between a pair of researchers. The complete regression
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model for (3.3) is of the form:
Pr(yijt = 1) = f(p
ij
t + 1 log c
ij
t + 2p
ij
t log c
ij
t + 1q
ij
t + 2q
ij
t + 3!
ij
t + z
ij
t + 
ij) (5.1)
where zijt stands for various controls such as n
ij
t ;n
ij
t and f
ij
t . As explained earlier, the in-
teraction term pijt log c
ij
t is included to test whether referrals only circulate in the coauthorship
network. If the coauthorship network is embedded inside a denser acquaintance network, at-
tenuation bias implies that 2 > 0; if referral circulates only in the coauthorship network, then
2 = 0.
17 Equation (5.1) is estimated using conditional logit to eliminate the xed e¤ect ij .
All regressors are detrended to eliminate spurious correlation with the dependent variable.18
We estimate model (5.1) on the entire dataset as well as on the restricted dataset of authors
with at least 20 publications. The dataset indeed contains a very large number of authors who
have only published a small number of journal articles. We suspect that these individuals are
not committed researchers. For occasional authors, it is conceivable that network interaction
does not work in the same fashion. To test the robustness of our ndings to the inclusion of
occasional authors, we estimate the model using both datasets.
We rst present results based on rst collaborations only. Coe¢ cient estimates, reported
in Table 2, show a very strong positive e¤ect of network proximity pijt : the magnitude of the
coe¢ cient is very large and the z-statistics is highly signicant in the full sample as well as in the
restricted sample with only high productivity researchers. This suggests that network proximity
plays an important role in research collaborations.
The coe¢ cient 1 of the (log of the) number of shortest paths log c
ij
t is not signicant in
the full regression but the coe¢ cient 2 of the interaction term is positive and signicant in
17Since we used proximity pijt instead of distance d
ij
t , the sign of the interaction term is reversed.
18 It is essential to detrend regressors using only observations entering in the estimation of (5.1). So detrending
is redone each time the inclusion of a new regressor, such as aijt , results in a loss of valid observations.
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both regressions. Put di¤erently, the number of shortests paths does not matter except at
short network distances. This is consistent with the idea that, as network proximity increases,
distance in the co-authorship network becomes a better measure of distance in an (unobserved)
acquaintance network. This result suggest that co-authorship referrals circulate in an unobserved
acquaintance network that is denser than the observed co-authership network.
Results also inform us regarding the type of complementarities that matter in economic
research. The coe¢ cient of the eld overlap index !ijt is positive and signicant in the entire
sample, indicating that, as expected, authors are more likely to initiate a collaboration if their
research interests converge. The coe¢ cient of the di¤erence in research output qijt is positive
in the full data set (rst column of Table 2), suggesting that authors are more likely to initiate
a research collaboration if they di¤er in ability or experience. This is indicative of dissimilar
matching, as would arise for instance when a well established researcher teams up with a junior
researcher. We also see that authors are more likely to initiate a collaboration when their average
research output falls. These results hold for the entire sample but not for the sample of high-
productivity authors where productivity variables are non-signicant. This is probably because
dropping less productive authors loses the kind of collaborations described above.
To better understand productivity e¤ects, iso-likelihood curves are depicted in Figure 3.
Each curve gives a combination of author output that yields the same likelihood of publishing
jointly at time t, conditional on not having published together until then. Likelihood falls as one
gets closer to the origin. The Figure shows that the iso-likelihood curves are sharply kinked. This
means that the likelihood of collaboration is rst and foremost a function of the productivity
of the most productive of the two authors: the more productive this author is, the longer it
takes for the pair to publish together. This makes sense: a productive author is someone who
publishes a lot in good journals. The more productive author i is, the less time i has to devote
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to publishing with j. The fact that the iso-likelihood curve is sharply kinked suggests that it
is the time of the most productive author that is the binding constraint. How productive the
less productive author is does not matter much. This is consistent with a model of scientic
collaboration in which the more productive author provides guidance while the less prominent
author provides his or her time.
Turning to controls, we see that, as anticipated, in both samples the likelihood of initiating
collaboration increases with the number of coauthors: the more coauthors researchers have, the
faster they are likely to collaborate with each other. The di¤erence in the number of collaborators
has a negative sign and is signicant in both samples as well.
Table 2 indicates the existence of a strong network proximity e¤ect. It is of interest to
ascertain whether this result is driven by a local e¤ect over very short network distances, or
whether it is a more di¤use e¤ect spreading over long network distances. Network e¤ects at very
short distances could be interpreted as evidence of common socialization, as would be the case
if researchers introduce their respective coauthors to each other. More di¤use network e¤ects,
say, at network distances over 4, are unlikely to be the result of such explicit socialization.
But, as explained earlier, it could indicate the existence of a denser acquaintance network.
To investigate this idea, we reestimate model (5.1) by replacing pijt with a series of dummy
variables representing network distance. Coe¢ cient estimates are presented in Figure 4 together
with their 95% condence interval (the dashed lines). We again show results for the full and
restricted samples. When interpreting the Figure, it is useful to remember that, prior to the
rst collaboration, network distance is a least 2.
Results show that network e¤ects are di¤use and are certainly not limited to short network
distances: in the full sample, network proximity has a signicantly positive e¤ect on the like-
lihood of collaboration for distances up to 11 degrees of separation. It is extremely unlikely
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that this results from explicit socialization among coauthors, i.e., from j introducing i to k, who
in turn introduces i to l, who introduces him to m, and so on 11 times. But it is consistent
with the existence of dark matter, that is, a denser but unobserved acquaintance network. In
the case of the sample restricted only to high productivity authors, coe¢ cients are estimated
less precisely, which may explain why network e¤ects are not signicant above four degrees of
separation.
As explained earlier, we worry that our network proximity results may be due to joint
a¢ liation: as researchers join the same department or institute, they may be more inclined
to work together. This local in-breeding e¤ect may generate a spurious relationship between
network proximity and co-authorship. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate the model
with the joint a¢ liation variable f ijt . As pointed out earlier, a¢ liation information is only
available after 1988. This means that adding f ijt results in a massive loss of observations more
than half.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3. Our main results are unchanged: network
proximity remains signicant in the full and restricted samples; the interaction term pijt log c
ij
t
remains signicant in the restricted sample; and average research output remains negative and
signicant in the full sample. Contrary to expectations, common a¢ liation has a negative e¤ect
on the likelihood of initiating a rst collaboration  the e¤ect is only signicant in the full
sample.19 When interpreting this nding, it is important to remember that estimation controls
for pairwise xed e¤ects. This means that identication is obtained only from pairs of authors
who, at some point in time, had a common a¢ liation but subsequently moved away from each
other. A negative sign means that such researchers are more likely to start collaborating after
moving apart. Why this is the case is unclear perhaps collaborating is a way to keep interacting
19The importance of de-trending all regressors is best illustrated by noting that, when common a¢ liation is not
detrended, it has a positive and signicant coe¢ cient.
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with each other, perhaps being in the same department engenders tensions and turf battles that
make collaboration more di¢ cult. For our purpose, the main point is that our proximity results
are not due to omitting a¢ liation data. Moreover, since aijt is either non-signicant or negative,
in-breeding bias is unlikely and consequently the results presented in Table 2 are probably safe.
5.2. Subsequent collaborations
Turning to subsequent collaborations, we reestimate equation (5.1) using data on subsequent
collaborations between two authors who have published one paper together. The form of the
regression is the same. Network proximity is dened as the distance between two authors in the
co-authorship network that ignores their own joint work. If network proximity is a signicant
determinant of rst collaboration because of a referral e¤ect, we would expect network proximity
not to be signicant for subsequent collaborations: since the two authors have published a paper
together, they no longer need to be introduced to each other.
Results are summarized in Table 4. As anticipated, network proximity no longer has a
positive e¤ect on the likelihood to collaborate. In fact, it is now negative and statistically
signicant in both the full sample and the sample restricted to highly productive researchers.
To investigate why this is the case, we reestimate the model with distance dummies, as we
did for Figure 4. Results are not shown here to save space. We nd that the only negative and
signicant dummy is for distance 2; other distance dummies are not signicant. What this means
is that two researchers who have published jointly in the past are less likely to publish again if
both of them are separately publishing with the same coauthor. This is probably not surprising:
both authors are busy publishing with the same co-author and thus have less time to publish
together. This interpretation is reinforced by noting that the coe¢ cient of the interaction term
pijt log c
ij
t is signicant and negative in the full and restricted samples. This means that the more
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common co-authors the two researchers have, the less likely they are to write together. These
ndings are consistent with an observation made by Goyal & van der Leij (2005), namely that
researchers with lots of di¤erent co-authors often appear in the network as stars, that is, their
co-authors seldom publish with each other separately. What our results suggest is that this may
be because they are kept busy by the star author and do not have the time to work with each
other.
We again nd that collaboration is more likely between authors who di¤er in the number
and quality of their publications, a result consistent with dissimilar matching. This result is
only observable in the full sample from which low productivity authors have not been dropped.
The likelihood of collaboration also falls with average research output, conrming that repeated
research collaboration is more likely among low productivity researchers. When we draw iso-
likelihood curves as in Figure 3, they nearly form a right angle.20 This suggests that the time
constraint of the most productive of the two authors is even more determinant in subsequent
collaborations than for the rst co-authored publication.
Turning to eld overlap, we nd that authors are more likely to publish together again if
their elds of interest drift apart. The e¤ect is large in magnitude and highly signicant in the
full and restricted samples. One possible explanation is that as their research interests evolve,
the two researchers acquire skills that may be complementary, inducing them to collaborate
again.
Control variables nijt and n
ij
t measuring number of coauthors have the opposite sign com-
pared to Table 2. This is true for the full and restricted samples. Authors with more coauthors
appear less likely to continue collaborating with the same person, while the di¤erence in num-
ber of coauthors nijt now has a positive sign. The negative sign for n
ij
t suggests that certain
20This is immediately apparent form the fact that the coe¢ cient of average output is nearly twice, in absolute
value, the coe¢ cient on output di¤erence.
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researchers have a higher propensity to seek new coauthors. As they do so, it leaves them less
time to continue collaborating with earlier coauthors. Such researchers tend to be less faithful
to earlier relationships as they seek an ever expanding number of coauthors. The positive sign
on nijt may be because, if one of the two coauthors initiates fewer collaborations with new
people, he or she may be able to rekindle a pre-existing collaboration, even if the other author
has continued to expand his or her nit.
In Table 5 we present the results of similar estimation where we have added a regressor for
common a¢ liation f ijt . We see that, although the size of the sample drops fairly dramatically,
results remain basically unchanged: all coe¢ cients retain the same sign and most gain in signi-
cance. This shows that the results presented in Table 4 are not an artifact of omitting a¢ liation
information. We again nd that common a¢ liation has a negative sign: co-authors are more
likely to continue writing together if they move apart. Why this is the case is not entirely clear 
it may be because researchers who move across departments or institutions tend to be more able
and hence more desirable co-authors, it may be because collaboration is a way for people with
similar interests to continue interacting. What matters here is that our conclusions regarding
network proximity are not a¤ected by changes in a¢ liation.
6. Conclusions
We have examined the process by which scientic collaborations are formed. In particular we
have investigated two hypotheses: do referrals by co-authors play a role in the initiation of
research collaborations, and do research collaborations bring together authors that are similar
or dissimilar. Using a simple model of co-authorship, we have shown that collaboration between
a low ability and a high ability author can arise if the low ability author provides labor while
the other provides guidance. We also devised a test of whether referrals travel only through the
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co-authorship network, or whether they travel through a denser but unobserved acquaintance
network in which the co-authorship network is embedded.
Because of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity, our testing strategy controls for
pair-wise xed e¤ects and relies solely on time-varying changes to identify factors that a¤ect
the likelihood of co-authorship. We develop an original way of dealing with potential bias in
estimating a discrete time duration model with xed e¤ects. Monte Carlo simulations demon-
strate that our method eliminates the bias inherent in this category of models, thereby opening
the door to the estimation of duration models with time-varying regressors and individual xed
e¤ects.
We applied this methodology to the Econlit database of joint publications in economic jour-
nals over the period 1969 to 1999. We use the databased to construct an index of eld overlap
as well as an indicator of common a¢ liation which is used as control variable. Our results
indicate that network proximity is a strong determinant of rst collaboration, suggesting that
co-author referrals play a role in the formation of scientic collaborations. We also conclude
that referrals travel through a network that is denser than the co-authorship, but in which the
latter is embedded. We call this the acquaintance network. We show that network proximity
does not increase the likelihood of subsequent collaboration, a result that is consistent with the
referral hypothesis.
Regarding the second hypothesis, we nd that co-authorship is more likely between dissimilar
authors, where ability is proxied by the quality and quantity of past publications. This is true
for rst as well as subsequent collaborations. This nding is consistent with the idea that one
author provides labor while the other provides guidance as is common, for instance, when a
doctoral student writes an article with his or her thesis supervisor.
Our results also throw additional light on the architecture of the scientic collaboration
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network studied by Goyal, van der Leij & Moraga-Gonzalez (2006) and Goyal & van der Leij
(2005). In particular, they indicate that clustering may be due to in-breeding bias co-author
referral circulates information locally in the acquaintance network, making it easier for proximate
authors to collaborate. In-breeding bias has important implications regarding the e¢ ciency of
research collaborations in the sense that isolated researchers are less likely to collaborate with
others. Researchers at the center of a dense web of collaborative relationships are much more
likely to form new collaborations.
The analysis presented here leaves important questions unanswered. It is unclear, for in-
stance, whether collaborations are benecial to researchers. It is indeed conceivable that collab-
orations are ine¢ cient because they entail coordination costs. Researchers, for instance, may
prefer to work alone but be compelled to accept to collaborate either for altruistic reasons (e.g.,
assisting less experienced researchers) or due to social pressure (e.g., sharing the fruits of aca-
demic success). Testing whether collaboration makes scientists more or less productive is the
object of future research.
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7. Appendix
In this appendix we illustrate the di¢ culty inherent in estimating a xed e¤ect logit model for
rst collaborations, and show how detrending regressors solves the problem. To this e¤ect, we
construct a Monte Carlo simulation that reproduces the kind of data we have. We begin by
generating pair-wise xed e¤ects ui  N(0; 5).21 We then create two potential regressors xit and
zit indexed over individual (e.g., pair of authors) i and time t. Each regressor is constructed as
a trend with noise:
xit = t+ "
x
it
zit = t+ "
z
it
with "xit  N(0; 100) and "xit  N(0; 100). A latent variable yit is then generated as:
yit =  2 + xit + ui + "it (7.1)
with "it  N(0; 400). The dichotomous dependent variable is dened as yait = 1 if yit > 0, 0
otherwise. Since zit does not enter equation (7.1), any correlation observed between zit and yait
must be regarded as spurious. We then dene yit = yait except if y
a
it s = 1 for any s > 0, in which
case yit is dened as missing. Variable yit thus has the same form as the dependent variable in
the rst collaboration case: a series of 0 ending with a single 1.
We generate 1000 samples of yait; yit; xit and zit, each with t = f1; :::20g and i = f1; :::100g.
We begin by regressing yait and yit on xit and zit using xed e¤ect logit. In the case of y
a
it, the
dependent variable switches back and forth from 0 to 1 with no clear trend. The xed e¤ect
21Variances a chosen so as to generate a distribution of the dependent variable that resembles that of the paper.
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Table 7.1: Monte Carlo results without detrending.
A. yait is the dependent variable E[coef] [coef] E[t-value] % signicant
coe¢ cient of xit 0.088 0.008 10.95 100%
coe¢ cient of zit 0.000 0.007 -0.04 5%
Number of observations 2000
B. yit is the dependent variable
coe¢ cient of xit 0.131 0.032 4.53 100%
coe¢ cient of zit 0.032 0.024 1.37 28%
Average number of usable observations 237
logit regressor therefore yields consistent coe¢ cient estimates and correct inference. In the case
of yit, however, for each i, the sequence of dependent variables ends with a 1. This creates a
spurious correlation with any regressor that includes a trend component. As a result, variable
xit may erroneously test signicant, leading to incorrect inference.
Results are shown in Table A1. The % signicant column gives the percentage of Monte
Carlo replications in which the coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 5% level. As
anticipated, the xed e¤ect logit applied to the full data yait yields a consistent 0 coe¢ cient for
zit. Moreover we see that the zit coe¢ cient is found signicant only in 5% of the regressions, a
proportion commensurate with the 5% signicance level used for the test. In contrast, results
for yit yield noticeably di¤erent coe¢ cients for zit and xit. Since coe¢ cients estimates for yait are
consistent, this indicates that the coe¢ cients of both xit and zit are inconsistently estimated by
applying xed e¤ect logit to rst collaboration-style data. Moreover, we see that in 28% of the
simulations we reject the (correct) null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient of zit is 0. In contrast, when
we perform this simulation without trend in xit and zit, results show no bias. The trend element
included in the regressors is what generates inconsistent estimates and incorrect inference.
This simple observation suggests that removing the trend in xit and zit may get rid of
the problem. Of the reader may worry that detrending the regressors would lose valuable
information that is essential to estimation. While this may be true in general, it is not the
case here because we are implicitly estimating a xed e¤ect duration model in which duration
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Table 7.2: Monte Carlo results with detrending.
A. yait is the dependent variable E[coef] [coef] E[t-value] % signicant
coe¢ cient of xdit 0.085 0.009 9.91 100%
coe¢ cient of zdit 0.000 0.008 -0.03 5%
Number of observations 2000
B. yit is the dependent variable
coe¢ cient of xdit 0.089 0.025 3.64 98%
coe¢ cient of zdit 0.000 0.021 0.00 4%
Average number of usable observations 237
dependence cannot be estimated independently from the xed e¤ect. Put di¤erently, we cannot
estimate the time dependence of the hazard. Consequently, it is intuitively clear that the trend
information contained in the regressors provides no information that is useful in identifying
coe¢ cients. For this reason, partially out the e¤ect of time is a valid solution to our inconsistent
estimation problem. We therefore estimate the following regressions:
xit = xt+ v
x
i + e
x
it
zit = zt+ v
z
i + e
z
it
and obtain xdit = xit   bxt and xdit = xit   bzt.
We then regress yit on xdit and z
d
it. If detrending solves the spurious correlation problem,
coe¢ cient estimates and inference should be similar to the results obtained in the rst panel of
Table A1. For the sake of comparison, we also regress yait on x
d
it and z
d
it. Results are presented
in Table A2. They show that detrending eliminates the bias in both coe¢ cients in the yit 
i.e., rst collaboration  regression while keeping things basically unchanged in the yait  i.e.,
repeated collaboration regression. There is of course a large loss of precision between the yait
regression and the detrended yit regression, but this is due to the massive loss of observations
that results from throwing away all observations of yait after the rst 1 realization. There is,
however, a slight loss of e¢ ciency when applying detrending to the repeated collaboration data.
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What these results show is that detrending regressors ensures consistent estimates and correct
inference in the rst collaboration regression while it still ensure consistent results in the repeated
collaboration regression.
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Table 2. New collaborations
Papers coauthored Estimator is fixed effect logit on detrended regressors
by authors with moreAll co-authored
than 20 publicationspapers
z-stat.Coef.z-stat.Coef.
4.531.17513.161.464Network proximity
-3.31-0.290-1.61-0.062Number of shortest paths (log)
3.822.2353.360.998Network proximity x N. of paths
1.590.0023.270.003Difference in research output
-0.57-0.001-5.91-0.009Average research output
0.350.0504.680.248Field overlap index
-2.08-0.024-2.80-0.017Difference in number of coauthors
7.020.13610.450.107Average number of coauthors
24446159170Number of observations
310326601Number of articles
22Minimum number of years
7.96Average number of years
2020Maximum number of years
Table 3. New collaborations, with affiliation control
Papers coauthored Estimator is fixed effect logit on detrended regressors
by authors with moreAll co-authored
than 20 publicationspapers
z-stat.Coef.z-stat.Coef.
1.700.5836.360.882Network proximity
-1.67-0.182-0.20-0.009Number of shortest paths (log)
1.801.2640.800.280Network proximity x N. of paths
0.700.0011.350.002Difference in research output
-0.36-0.001-3.11-0.006Average research output
0.100.0221.650.119Field overlap index
-0.36-0.005-0.16-0.001Difference in number of coauthors
1.320.0332.190.029Average number of coauthors
-1.20-0.118-6.88-0.259Common affiliation
1194986964Number of observations
198317272Number of articles
22Minimum number of years
65Average number of years
1212Maximum number of years
Table 4. Subsequent collaborations
Papers coauthored Estimator is fixed effect logit on detrended regressors
by authors with moreAll co-authored
than 20 publicationspapers
z-stat.Coef.z-stat.Coef.
-5.05-0.757-8.44-0.622Network proximity
0.440.0344.610.178Number of shortest paths (log)
-2.12-0.509-8.03-1.129Network proximity x N. of paths
0.810.0016.510.006Difference in research output
-0.33-0.001-10.27-0.012Average research output
-4.44-0.761-20.36-1.518Field overlap index
2.950.0226.640.034Difference in number of coauthors
-4.51-0.052-13.45-0.108Average number of coauthors
20895105427Number of observations
186014449Number of articles
22Minimum number of years
11.27.3Average number of years
2020Maximum number of years
Table 5. Subsequent collaborations, with affiliation control
Papers coauthored Estimator is fixed effect logit on detrended regressors
by authors with moreAll co-authored
than 20 publicationspapers
z-stat.Coef.z-stat.Coef.
-2.60-0.765-9.38-1.524Network proximity
-0.87-0.1253.300.231Dummy whether connected
1.890.1931.970.105Number of shortest paths (log)
-3.13-0.997-5.99-1.116Network proximity x N. of paths
1.380.0026.370.007Difference in research output
-1.65-0.003-10.24-0.014Average research output
-4.80-1.210-19.03-2.103Field overlap index
2.360.0236.910.045Difference in number of coauthors
-2.72-0.042-12.86-0.140Average number of coauthors
1.540.120-5.73-0.220Common affiliation
1337261336Number of observations
15239919Number of articles
22Minimum number of years
8.86.2Average number of years
1212Maximum number of years
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